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THE TWOMBLY STANDARD AND AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES:  WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE GOOSE IS 
NOT ALWAYS GOOD FOR THE GANDER 
Anthony Gambol*
 
 
The United States district courts disagree as to whether the plausibility 
pleading standard for claims first described by the United States Supreme 
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly also extends to affirmative 
defenses pled by defendants in federal courts.  The divergent opinions result 
from conflicting interpretations of the language of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, standards of preferred practice, and notions of fairness. 
This Note examines the district courts’ arguments in deciding whether 
the Twombly standard extends to affirmative defenses.  It identifies the 
quiddities of the courts’ reasoning through an analysis of their decisions 
and, based upon this review, argues that the courts should not extend the 
Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.  This Note shows how this 
conclusion adheres to the text and intention of the Federal Rules, as well as 
the holding and public policy considerations of Twombly itself.  Moreover, 
it acknowledges that simple injustice would befall defendants on account of 
an extension of the Twombly standard. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2009, Michael and Diane Wszola were in a dispute with their 
former neighbors, the Shinews, over the use of their shared lakefront 
property.1  The Shinews had moved and sued, seeking judgment that they 
were entitled to rent out the land.2  The property had been a point of 
contention before; both the Wszolas and the Shinews had been parties to a 
state court litigation that had defined the property’s ownership rights and its 
authorized users.3
 
 1. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Jury Demand at 8, Shinew v. Wszola, 
Civil Action No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 2008), 2008 U.S. Dist. 
Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 8317, at *5–6. 
 
 2. See id. at 4–7. 
 3. See Motion for Summary Disposition at 4–6, Shinew v. Wszola, Civil Action No. 
08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 3834473. 
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Through inadvertence, the Wszolas forgot to add a few affirmative 
defenses to their responsive pleading.4  The time within which they could 
amend their pleadings by right had passed, so they needed to move the 
court for leave to do so.5  They set forth a list of affirmative defenses that 
they wished to rely upon, including a res judicata defense that may have 
precluded the federal action, because the question had already been settled 
in state court.6  The Shinews opposed the motion, arguing that the 
affirmative defenses were insufficiently pled.7
The Wszolas could not have imagined that their motion would be denied.  
Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,
 
8 the relevant precedent in the district, had allowed a 
succinctly pled affirmative defense to stand.  While the Supreme Court had 
increased the specificity with which claims had to be pled in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly,9 just a few months earlier the district in which the 
Wszolas were sued had concluded in First National Insurance Co. of 
America v. Camps Services, Ltd.10
The First National court acknowledged that Twombly “raised the 
requirements for a well-pled complaint” under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a), but distinguished the language of Rule 8(c), the “applicable 
rule for affirmative defenses.”
 that Twombly did not extend to 
affirmative defenses. 
11  As such, the court found that Twombly’s 
analysis of the Rule 8(a) requirements was inapplicable to Rule 8(c).12  The 
court accordingly applied the pleading standard for affirmative defenses 
articulated in Davis and allowed the defendant’s succinct affirmative 
defense to stand.13
It must have then come as a surprise to the Wszolas when the district 
court in its opinion criticized the Wszolas’ proposed affirmative defenses as 
a “grocery list.”
 
14
 
 4. See Motion To Amend Pleadings at 2, Shinew v. Wszola, Civil Action No. 08-
14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 
5756, at *1. 
  The court conceded that “the assertion of affirmative 
defenses in that manner is not uncommon” and had been “widely employed 
 5. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (explaining that parties in federal court have twenty-one 
days to make amendments to their pleadings as of right, after which time a party may amend 
its pleading only with the opposing party’s consent or leave of the court). 
 6. See Motion To Amend Pleadings, supra note 4, at 4 (“Plaintiffs claims are barred by 
waiver, laches, estoppel, res judicata, collateral estoppel, the applicable statute of limitations, 
and the statute of repose.”). 
 7. See Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion To Amend Pleadings at 7–
9, Shinew v. Wszola, Civil Action No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 
2009), 2009 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 5757, at *10–13. 
 8. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 9. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 10. No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 WL 22861 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009). 
 11. See id. at *2. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See id. (“The affirmative defenses laid out by Camps in this case are similar to those 
in Davis, and provide adequate notice to First National.”). 
 14. See Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 
2009). 
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(and tolerated) as a form of ‘notice pleading.’”15  However, the court 
believed that the dissent in Davis presaged the application of the pleading 
standard for claims described in Twombly to defensive pleadings.16  
Moreover, the court believed that the problem of discovery costs 
contemplated by Twombly was applicable to both claims and defenses.17  
Accordingly, the court held that the Twombly standard extended to 
affirmative defenses.18  Thereupon, the court found that the Wszolas’ 
proposed affirmative defenses were insufficiently pled19 and denied them 
leave to amend.20
As the Wszolas’ problem suggests, the district courts are divided as to 
whether the plausibility pleading standard for claims originally described in 
Twombly and clarified in Ashcroft v. Iqbal
 
21 also extends to defendants’ 
affirmative defenses.  The issue usually arises in the context of Rule 12(f) 
motions to strike an affirmative defense.22  The tension between an 
extension of the Twombly standard and the language of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (Rules) has resulted in some creative jurisprudence.23  A 
bounty of “well-reasoned case law” exists on both sides, with the decisions 
turning upon the structure of the Federal Rules as well as “relevant policy 
considerations and principles of fairness.”24  No circuit court has yet ruled 
on the issue.25
 
 15. See id. at *2 (downplaying as “clearly dicta” precedent which holds that Rule 8(b) 
does not apply when a defendant asserts an affirmative defense). 
 
 16. See id. at *3–4. 
 17. See id. at *4. 
 18. See id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has established a general standard of pleading matters 
upon which the pleader assumes the burden of proof.”). 
 19. See id. at *4 (“The proposed amended pleading offered by Defendants in this case is 
the very essence of the boilerplate ‘labels and conclusions’ which the court in Twombly 
found insufficient.”). 
 20. See id. at *5–6 (“Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) provides that a court should freely grant 
leave to amend a pleading ‘when justice so requires.’  The party requesting the amendment 
bears the burden of establishing that the standard is met.”). 
 21. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 22. See, e.g., First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camps Servs., Ltd., No. 08-cv-12805, 2009 
WL 22861, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2009).  The other common context in which the issue 
arises is a contested Rule 15(a) motion to amend the pleadings where an affirmative defense 
is offered for inclusion. See, e.g., Shinew, 2009 WL 1076279, at *1. 
 23. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Civil Action No. 09-10239-RGS, 
2009 WL 2449872, at *1 (D. Mass. Aug. 6, 2009) (attempting to reconcile its disposition to 
extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses with both common practice and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) by developing a hybrid standard under which only 
those affirmative defenses that are not listed under Rule 8(c)(1) must have factual support 
because those affirmative defenses which are listed under Rule 8(c)(1) are so commonly 
used and spartanly pled that they inherently provide sufficient notice to satisfy the Twombly 
standard simply by being stated). 
 24. See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., Civil Action No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 
2605179, at *4 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010). 
 25. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77083, at *16 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (“[N]either the Fourth Circuit nor any other 
court of appeals has ruled on the question presented:  whether Twombly and Iqbal extended 
the federal pleading requirements to a defendant’s affirmative defenses.”). 
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A defendant does not select to be haled into court; a policy that limits 
recourse to a full and vigorous defense deserves careful scrutiny.  This Note 
explores district courts’ arguments in determining whether the Twombly 
standard extends to affirmative defenses.  Based on those considerations, 
this Note argues that courts should not extend the Twombly standard to 
affirmative defenses.  In Part I, this Note explores the procedural rules and 
pleading standards for claims and affirmative defenses in federal courts, 
including the modification of the pleading standard for claims articulated in 
Twombly and Iqbal.  In Part II, this Note examines the conflicting 
arguments relied upon by the district courts in deciding that the Twombly 
standard does or does not extend to affirmative defenses.  Finally, in Part 
III, this Note argues on grounds of procedure, precedent, and policy that 
courts should not extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses. 
I.  PROCEDURE AND POLICY:  PLEADINGS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Part I of this Note explores the federal procedural rules and pleading 
standard.  Part I.A introduces the Federal Rules and gives a brief account of 
their purpose in federal courts, as well as the process through which they 
may be amended.  Part I.B traces the evolution of the pleading standard for 
claims in federal courts from the promulgation of the Rules to the present 
day, including the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in Twombly and 
Iqbal, and discusses the rationale and impact of the modern pleading 
standard.  Then, Part I.C discusses the pleading of affirmative defenses by 
defendants before Twombly and outlines the standard by which the 
sufficiency of an affirmative defense was determined in a motion under 
Rule 12(f)—when a plaintiff moves to strike an affirmative defense from 
the pleadings. 
A.  The Federal Rules 
The Federal Rules govern procedure in all civil actions and proceedings 
in the United States district courts.26  With the passage of the Rules 
Enabling Act (Act), Congress vested the Supreme Court with the authority 
to prescribe the Rules and described processes through which such 
prescriptions would be enacted.27  Congress passed the current Act “to 
modernize the current statutory provisions relating to the Federal judiciary’s 
role in promulgating amendments to . . . various rules of procedure 
applicable to the Federal courts.”28
 
 26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 
 27. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall 
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for 
cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges 
thereof) and courts of appeals.”); see also Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role 
in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1045–46 
(1993). 
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 3, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5982, 5986. 
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Congress believed that the Court had overstepped the bounds of its 
rulemaking authority in the years immediately preceding the passage of the 
current Act and, accordingly, limited the scope of the Court’s rulemaking 
authority to those areas within its particular area of competence.29  
Specifically, Congress ensured that the Rules promulgated by the Court 
would be strictly procedural in nature.30  Because the Federal Rules are 
ultimately statutory, changes can only be accomplished “by the process of 
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”31  Even so, 
the Federal Rules are frequently updated and amended, including a 
substantial revision in 2007 for the purposes of “clarifying and simplifying 
the rules, making them easier to use and understand, without changing 
substantive meaning.”32
B.  The Federal Pleading Standard for Claims:  From Conley to Twombly 
and Iqbal 
 
When they were first adopted, the Rules were meant to institute a 
procedural form that was more accessible than the earlier forms of pleading 
 
 29. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 22 (1985) (“So viewed, proposed section 2072 leaves 
to the Supreme Court primary responsibility for prospective federal regulation of matters 
peculiarly within the competence of judges.  It reserves to Congress decisions concerning 
prospective federal regulation of matters peculiarly within its competence, having regard to 
Congress’ representative nature and to its experience in prospective lawmaking that 
variously affects its constituencies in their out-of-court affairs.  Further refinement of the 
scope of delegation will undoubtedly prove necessary.  The Committee believes, however, 
that such refinement should come in the first instance from those responsible for proposing 
rules.  Conscientious attention to the purposes of, and limitations on, the delegation should 
prevent controversy of the sort that has plagued federal supervisory court rulemaking in 
recent years.”). 
 30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (“[The Federal Rules] shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21–22 (“[T]he bill does not confer 
power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and 
preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under the substantive law.  
The protection extends beyond rules of substantive law, narrowly defined, however.  At the 
least, it also prevents the application of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have 
the effect of altering existing remedial rights . . . .  [It] is intended to allocate to Congress, as 
opposed to the Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power, lawmaking choices 
that necessarily and obviously require consideration of policies extrinsic to the business of 
the courts . . . .”). 
 31. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (citing Leatherman v. 
Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)); see also Pavelic & 
LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (“We give the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure their plain meaning . . . .”). But see Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to 
Twombly to Iqbal:  A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 
94 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s bypass of the rulemaking process in Twombly raises the 
question:  what is the purpose of today’s elaborate statutory process, given the Court’s 
willingness to revise important aspects of the Rules on its own rather than follow its existing 
precedents?”). 
 32. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 19 (2006), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ 
CV06-2006.pdf. 
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that preceded it.33  In particular, Rule 8 “embodie[d] this major shift in 
approach.”34  Rule 8 describes the requirements for pleadings in federal 
courts.35
 
 33. See Hon. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943) (“Strict 
pleading produces a reaction, because people will not tolerate the denial of justice for 
formalities only.  That, as we should do well to recall, was the history of common-law 
pleading, as well as of some of the later misapplications of code pleading.”); see also LINDA 
J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 540 (3d ed. 2009) (“The 
modern pleader is at much lesser risk of losing his rights through a technical pleading 
mistake.”). 
  The pleadings in a lawsuit set forth the parties’ contentions in the 
 34. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern 
World of Civil Litigation:  The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1118 (2010). 
 35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (“Rule 8:  General Rules of Pleading 
(a) Claims for Relief.  A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court 
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; 
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and 
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different 
types of relief. 
(b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials. 
(1) In General.  In responding to a pleading, a party must: 
(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and 
(B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party. 
(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance.  A denial must fairly respond to the substance of 
the allegation. 
(3) General and Specific Denials.  A party that intends in good faith to deny all the 
allegations of a pleading—including the jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general 
denial.  A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny 
designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted. 
(4) Denying Part of an Allegation.  A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of an 
allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest. 
(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information.  A party that lacks knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has 
the effect of a denial. 
(6) Effect of Failing to Deny.  An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of 
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.  If 
a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided. 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. 
(1) In General.  In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance 
or affirmative defense, including:  accord and satisfaction; arbitration and award; assumption 
of risk; contributory negligence; discharge in bankruptcy; duress; estoppel; failure of 
consideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant; laches; license; payment; release; 
res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver. 
(2) Mistaken Designation.  If a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it 
were correctly designated, and may impose terms for doing so. 
(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency. 
(1) In General.  Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.  No technical form is 
required. 
(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense.  A party may set out 2 or more statements 
of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in 
separate ones.  If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of 
them is sufficient. 
(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses.  A party may state as many separate claims or defenses 
as it has, regardless of consistency. 
(e) Construing Pleadings. 
Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). 
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suit; they are usually composed of the plaintiff’s complaint (containing 
claims) and the defendant’s answer to the complaint (containing denials, 
admissions, and defenses).36  Generally, plaintiffs must prove their claims 
and defendants must prove their defenses.37
The legal sufficiency of a claim is challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
 
38  
This motion posits that even if the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s 
complaint are true, the law does not grant the plaintiff a right to relief.39
This section introduces the pleading standard for claims in the federal 
courts.  First, it describes the long-standing Conley decision and the 
pleading standard that Conley implemented.  Then, it explores Twombly’s 
abrogation of the Conley standard and the adoption of the plausibility 
pleading standard for claims, which is clarified in Iqbal. 
  
Even with Rule 12(b)(6) in place, the Supreme Court did not define the 
standard of pleading necessary to display the legal sufficiency of a claim for 
nearly twenty years after the first Rules were promulgated. 
1.  The Conley Standard 
In 1957, the standard for pleading a complaint in the federal courts was 
described in Conley v. Gibson.40  The action in Conley was brought as a 
class suit under the Railway Labor Act.41 The plaintiffs, African American 
railway workers, alleged that their union did not represent them equally and 
in good faith compared to their white counterparts.42  The lower courts had 
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court rejected 
that conclusion and ruled that the action could proceed.43  Because the 
lower courts had not considered the other arguments offered on account of 
the jurisdictional dismissal, the Court addressed those arguments before 
remand.44  Among others, the union defendants argued that the plaintiffs 
had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and that the 
complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations 
of discrimination.45
The Court appraised the sufficiency of the complaint by following “the 
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
 
46
 
 36. See SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 535. 
  To this 
end, the Court found that the “decisive answer” was in the Federal Rules, 
which do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he 
 37. See id. at 556–57. 
 38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 39. See SILBERMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at 595–96. 
 40. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 41. See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 42. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43. 
 43. See id. at 43–45. 
 44. See id. at 45–48. 
 45. See id. at 45, 47. 
 46. Id. at 45–46. 
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bases his claim.47  Rather, a complaint needed only to contain “a short and 
plain statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what 
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”48  The Federal 
Rules suggested this “notice pleading” in their discovery and other pretrial 
procedures to “disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense 
and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”49  Accordingly, 
the Court found that plaintiffs in Conley had adequately set forth a claim 
and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis.50  In holding that the 
plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim, the Conley Court maintained that 
the Federal Rules “reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in 
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept 
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on 
the merits.”51
“Conley quickly became the dominant case interpreting modern pleading 
doctrine.”
 
52  A plaintiff satisfied Conley if it provided a defendant with fair 
notice of the claim.53  For fifty years, the Supreme Court defended the 
language of the Federal Rules and the practice of “notice” pleading 
described by Conley’s “no set of facts” language from encroaching 
requirements of greater particularity in pleading claims, despite some 
criticism.54  That changed with the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in 
Twombly.55
2.  The Twombly Standard 
 
Twombly replaced Conley’s notice pleading standard with the more 
demanding “plausibility” pleading standard for claims.56
 
 47. See id. at 47. 
  As will be 
explored later in this Note, district courts deciding whether to extend the 
 48. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49. Id. at 47–48 & n.9 (pointing to Rule 12(e) (motion for a more definite statement), 
Rule 12(f) (motion to strike a portion of a pleading), Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the 
pleadings), Rule 16 (pre-trial procedure), Rules 26–37 (rules for depositions and discovery), 
Rule 56 (motion for summary judgment), and Rule 15 (right to amend) as Rules that allow 
for inquiry into the basis of pleadings and to narrow the dispute). 
 50. See id. at 48. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 111 (2009). 
 53. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1300–02 
(2010). 
 54. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993) (“We think that it is impossible to square the ‘heightened pleading standard’ 
applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by 
the Federal Rules.”). But see Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (noting the tension between Conley’s “no set of facts” language and its averment 
that a plaintiff must display the “grounds” upon which its claim rests). 
 55. See, e.g., Gaines v. Lawrence, No. 07-3212-SAC, 2010 WL 3829467, at *3 n.7 
(D. Kan. Sept. 22, 2010) (“‘[T]he accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,’ as stated in Conley v. Gibson, 
was abrogated in Twombly.” (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46)). 
 56. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 1108–09. 
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Twombly standard to affirmative defenses rely heavily upon the language 
and meaning of Twombly and its sister case, Iqbal.57
a.  Plausibility Conceived:  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 
  Accordingly, these 
cases will be discussed in detail. 
The controversy in Twombly58 entailed a putative class action59 brought 
on behalf of local telephone and high speed Internet users over a seven-year 
period.60  The complaint alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade under the 
Sherman Act61 on the part of incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs), 
the regional phone and internet service monopolies.62  The complaint 
theorized that the ILECs illegally agreed to hinder smaller carriers’ access 
to their markets and maintain artificially high prices for consumers by not 
competing with one another.63
The Court, through Justice David H. Souter, noted that conscious 
parallelism
 
64 is not, in itself, unlawful and that such actions may be 
“consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of 
rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by 
common perceptions of the market.”65  Accordingly, the Court stated that 
the plaintiff must display evidence that tended to “exclude the possibility of 
independent action” by the ILECs.66
The Court concluded that the antecedent question was what a plaintiff 
needed to plead to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
 
67  Citing 
Conley, the Court interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring only “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in 
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”68  To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss, a claim did not need detailed factual allegations, but “a plaintiff’s 
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires 
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 
of a cause of action will not do.”69
 
 57. See infra Part II. 
  The facts pled must be sufficient “to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that 
 58. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (allowing members of a group (class) to sue or be sued on 
behalf of all members). 
 60. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 62. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
 63. See id. at 550–51. 
 64. See id. at 553–54 (describing “conscious parallelism” as a knowingly shared, but not 
explicitly agreed to, course of action maintained because it is in each party’s best economic 
interest). 
 65. Id. at 554. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 554–55. 
 68. Id. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Id. (alteration in original). 
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all the allegations in the complaint are true.”70  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court reasoned that “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing’ . . . of 
entitlement to relief.  Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is 
hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not 
only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the 
claim rests.”71
Applying these “general standards” to the pleading at hand, the Court 
explained that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does 
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls 
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence of illegal agreement.”
 
72  Further, the Court expounded that this 
requirement at the pleading stage for “allegations plausibly suggesting” an 
agreement between the ILECs “reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 
8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’”73  The Court found that allegations detailing 
parallel conduct got “close to stating a claim, but without some further 
factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and 
plausibility of ‘entitle[ment] to relief.’”74
For the sake of time and money of both the parties and the courts, the 
Court instructed that a deficient complaint should be excised at the earliest 
convenience.
 
75  While acknowledging a sense of caution inherent in 
dismissing a claim before discovery has occurred, the Court highlighted the 
expense involved in an antitrust discovery process:  “‘a district court must 
retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing 
a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.’”76  The Court did not 
believe that judicial supervision and case management, however careful, 
could successfully defend against abusive discovery practices or groundless 
claims that fall just shy of plausible entitlement to relief.77  “Probably, then, 
it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting 
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of 
discovery in cases with no reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] 
process will reveal relevant evidence.”78
The plaintiffs in Twombly argued that Conley’s standard for evaluating 
motions to dismiss precluded the application of the “plausibility standard” 
at the pleading stage.
 
79
 
 70. Id. at 555–56 (citation omitted). 
  The Court admitted that the “no set of facts” 
language, when read in isolation—a “focused and literal reading”—would 
 71. Id. at 555 n.3. 
 72. Id. at 556. 
 73. Id. at 557 (alteration in original). 
 74. Id. (alteration in original). 
 75. See id. at 558. 
 76. Id. (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 
n.17 (1983)). 
 77. See id. at 559 (lamenting that the threat of discovery expenses will compel 
defendants to settle even unmeritorious cases). 
 78. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dura Pharm., 
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)). 
 79. See id. at 560–61. 
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allow a “wholly conclusory” claim to survive a motion to dismiss when the 
pleading left open the possibility of later establishing some set of 
undisclosed facts to support recovery.80  Describing how the Conley “no set 
of facts” language had been generally misinterpreted, the Court decided that 
that “famous observation has earned its retirement.”81
The Supreme Court then, applying its interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) and 
Conley, found that the plaintiffs’ complaint came up short.
 
82  “We think 
that nothing contained in the complaint invests either the action or inaction 
alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” due to “obvious 
alternative explanation[s].”83  The Court clarified that it did not require 
heightened factual specificity, but only enough facts “to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.  Because the plaintiffs here have not 
nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 
complaint must be dismissed.”84
Justice John Paul Stevens argued in dissent that judicial opinion 
regarding the plausibility of a claim was an insufficient justification for 
dismissal.
 
85  Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that parallel conduct on 
the part of the ILECs was consistent with the absence of an agreement 
between them, but also noted that that conduct was consistent with the 
presence of an illegal agreement.86  Justice Stevens attributed the Court’s 
decision to practical concerns:  private antitrust litigation can be very 
expensive and jurors might mistakenly infer agreement from evidence of 
parallel conduct.87  Justice Stevens insisted, however, that the remedy for 
those problems was “careful case management, including strict control of 
discovery, careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage, and 
lucid instructions to juries,” not dismissal or an interpretation of Rule 
12(b)(6) that “seems to be driven by the majority’s appraisal of the 
plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather than its legal 
sufficiency.”88  Criticizing the majority’s decision as being in tension with 
both Rule 8 and Rule 9,89
 
 80. See id. at 561. 
 Justice Stevens noted that the majority opinion 
 81. Id. at 563 & n.8 (“The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard:  once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by 
showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. . . . Conley, then, 
described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the 
minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”). 
 82. See id. at 564. 
 83. Id. at 566–67 (finding that the economic incentives of individual incumbent local 
exchange carriers (ILECs) are sufficient to explain their conduct and, accordingly, there is 
no reason to infer that the ILECs agreed among themselves to do what was already in their 
own best interest). 
 84. Id. at 570.  The Court squared its holding with Rule 9, which delineates specific 
instances in which pleadings must be pled with specificity. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9; Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 569 & n.14. 
 85. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 571 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 86. See id. at 572–73. 
 87. See id. at 573. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 573–76 & n.3; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9 (requiring that some allegations, 
not including states of mind, be pled with specificity); supra note 35. 
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was the first by the Court to express “any doubt as to the adequacy” of the 
Conley standard.90  Moreover, Justice Stevens implied that the majority’s 
creation of the new standard might exceed the Court’s authority under the 
Rules Enabling Act.91
Justice Stevens argued that the pleading standard codified in the Federal 
Rules “does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts,” and that, 
despite the majority’s reinterpretation, the Conley standard reflected what a 
complaint must contain, not what it may contain.
 
92  Justice Stevens 
criticized the majority’s new standard as inappropriate at the pleadings 
stage, especially in antitrust cases where pre-pleading discovery is difficult 
and Congress encourages private litigation.93  Justice Stevens further 
contended that even if the claim, due to its lack of specificity, does not give 
the notice that Rule 8 requires, the appropriate remedy “for an allegation 
lacking sufficient specificity to provide adequate notice is, of course, a Rule 
12(e) motion for a more definite statement.”94  As to the majority’s policy 
concern about the burdens of discovery and litigation, Justice Stevens 
emphasized the district court’s case management arsenal, with which it may 
control the proceedings before it.95
Justice Stevens acknowledged the potential for a dramatic shift in the 
pleading standard for claims.
 
96  Whereas Conley had asked only that a 
plaintiff be able to display some set of facts to support its recovery,97 
Twombly seemed to require a plaintiff to show sufficient facts to convince a 
court that its claim was plausible.98  For a while, however, the reach of the 
Court’s decision in Twombly was unclear due to its grounding in antitrust 
law.99
 
 90. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577–78 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing the sixteen 
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court had cited to Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language). 
  Further, the Court’s continued reliance upon the “notice pleading” 
 91. See id. at 579. 
 92. See id. at 580, 588 n.8 (“Here, the failure the majority identifies is not a failure of 
notice—which ‘notice pleading’ rightly condemns—but rather a failure to satisfy the Court 
that the agreement alleged might plausibly have occurred.  That being a question not of 
notice but of proof, it should not be answered without first hearing from the defendants (as 
apart from their lawyers).”). 
 93. See id. at 585–87. 
 94. Id. at 590 n.9. 
 95. See id. at 593 n.13 (citing Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite statement, Rule 
(7)(a) court-ordered plaintiff’s replies to answers, Rule 23 class certification motions’ 
“rigorous analysis” by courts, Rule 16’s court sanctioning powers and pretrial proceedings 
control, including “elimination of frivolous claims or defenses” and “the control and 
scheduling of discovery,” Rule 26’s court control over discovery, especially Rule 26(c)’s 
specific permission for a court to protect a party from “annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression, or undue burden or expense” caused by discovery, and the sanctions allowed by 
Rule 11 for improper or frivolous claims and arguments). 
 96. See id. at 596 (“Whether the Court’s actions will benefit only defendants in antitrust 
treble-damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a complaint will inure to the 
benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the future will answer.”). 
 97. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
 98. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 99. See, e.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e believe the 
Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead 
requiring a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with 
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standard described in Conley implied that it had not fully abandoned that 
precedent.100  However, the intended scope of Twombly became clearer in 
2009 with Iqbal,101
b.  Plausibility Defined:  Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
 which clarified the plausibility pleading standard and 
extended it to all claims pled in federal court. 
The controversy in Iqbal concerned the dismissal of respondent plaintiff 
Javaid Iqbal’s complaint against defendant petitioners former Attorney 
General John Ashcroft and Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Robert 
Mueller.102  Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was detained on immigration 
charges following the September 11th attacks and was deemed to be of high 
interest to the investigation into that incident.103  Accordingly, he was 
moved into restrictive conditions in a maximum security unit, where he was 
allegedly subjected to serious mistreatment.104  Iqbal pled guilty to his 
immigration charges and was deported to Pakistan.105  Iqbal brought Bivens 
actions106 for violations of his First and Fifth Amendment rights against 
more than fifty federal officials at all levels of government.107
 
some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the 
claim plausible.”), rev’d, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Temple v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., Nos. 06 CV 5303(JG), 06 CV 5304(JG), 2007 WL 2790154, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 25, 2007) (noting the confusion resultant from the Twombly decision and suggesting 
that the plausibility pleading standard applies only in the context of antitrust litigation); J. 
Douglas Richards, Three Limitations of Twombly:  Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a 
Context of Historical Monopoly, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 851–52 (2008) (“All of the 
references in Twombly to a ‘plausibility’ requirement are couched in relation to allegations 
of antitrust conspiracy, and not to the pleading of claims generally. . . . [T]he opinion 
expresses the requirement of ‘plausibility’ only in the course of ‘applying these general 
standards to a § 1 [of The Sherman Act] claim’ . . . .”). 
  At issue in 
the instant case, however, were only those claims against Ashcroft and 
 100. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (“Specific facts are not necessary; 
the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 
at 555)); see also Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Twombly and Iqbal:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement of Gregory 
G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, former Solicitor General of the United States, 
United States Department of Justice), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-
09%20Garre%20Testimony.pdf (“[I]t is worth emphasizing that the Court did not overrule 
the Conley decision in Twombly.  It simply clarified that a particular phrase in Conley—the 
‘no set of facts’ language—was ‘an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading 
standard.’  In doing so, the Court in Twombly observed that the civil rights complaint in 
Conley ‘amply’ stated a claim under the proper pleading standard, making the ‘no set of 
facts’ language an unnecessary part of the Court’s decision.”). 
 101. 129 S. Ct. 1937. 
 102. See id. at 1942. 
 103. See id. at 1942–43. 
 104. See id. at 1943–44. 
 105. See id. at 1943. 
 106. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 397 (1971) (finding an implied cause of action allowing for recovery of monetary 
damages from federal agents who violate a claimant’s constitutional rights). 
 107. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44; see also U.S. CONST. amends. I, V. 
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Mueller.108  The claim alleged that petitioners “‘each knew of, condoned, 
and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject’ respondent to harsh 
conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] 
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological 
interest.’”109
At trial, Ashcroft and Mueller moved to dismiss the claims against them 
with defenses of qualified immunity
 
110 and lack of personal involvement, 
but were rejected by the court, which applied Conley’s “no set of facts” 
standard.111  Invoking the collateral-order doctrine, which allows for 
appeals of final determinations related to claims of right separable from an 
underlying cause of action, they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit.112  While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided Twombly.113  Thereupon, the Second Circuit applied its 
interpretation of the Twombly standard to the petitioners’ appeal and 
affirmed the district court’s rejection of their argument.114
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-Justice majority.
  Ashcroft and 
Mueller appealed this decision. 
115  The Court first 
established that, to overcome qualified immunity, Iqbal must have pled 
petitioners’ individual unconstitutional actions because government 
officials may not be held liable for a subordinate’s act.116  Further, the 
pleading must have displayed discriminatory purpose—that a course of 
action was taken because of, and not merely in spite of, adverse effects 
upon an identifiable group.117
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Twombly that, under Rule 8(a)(2), a 
pleading does not require detailed factual allegations, but demands more 
than an unadorned accusation.
  Accordingly, the Court examined the 
complaint to see if it had been sufficiently pled. 
118  A complaint must contain enough factual 
matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.119
 
 108. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
  A claim is 
facially plausible when the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allow the 
court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
 109. Id. (alteration in original). 
 110. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“[Qualified immunity means] 
that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”). 
 111. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 112. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2007). 
 113. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 114. See id.; see also Hasty, 490 F.3d at 157–58, 166, 174–76. 
 115. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942–54. 
 116. See id. at 1948. 
 117. See id. (citing Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 118. See id. at 1949 (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.  Nor does a complaint suffice if it 
tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 
557)). 
 119. See id. 
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misconduct alleged.”120  The Court maintained that this was not a 
probability requirement; however, it does require enough factual support to 
suggest “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.”121
The Court described two “working principles” that underlay Twombly.
 
122  
First, when deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must suppose as true all of 
the factual allegations of the complaint, but not the legal conclusions.123  
Rule 8 did not “unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with 
nothing more than conclusions.”124  Second, only a complaint that 
contained a plausible claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss.125  
The plausibility of a claim for relief is a “context-specific” determination 
which requires the deciding court to rely upon “judicial experience and 
common sense.”126  Where the factual content of a complaint does not 
allow for the court to infer more than the “mere possibility of misconduct,” 
the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief.127  These 
principles translate into a two-step process of review for Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss.  First, a court must identify those claims which are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth because they are unsupported by factual 
allegations and are “no more than conclusions.”128  A court must then 
assume the truth of the remaining allegations and decide whether they 
plausibly gave rise to an entitlement to relief.129
Applying this process, the Court found that Iqbal’s pleading was 
insufficient.  First, most of the allegations were not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.
 
130  Next, the well-pled factual allegations did not give 
rise to a plausible inference that Iqbal was entitled to relief.131  The 
allegations were consistent with a discriminatory course of action by the 
petitioners, but because “more likely explanations” existed, they did not 
“plausibly establish this purpose.”132  Accordingly, the complaint was not 
pled with the requisite specificity.133
 
 120. Id. 
 
 121. Id. (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 
liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 
relief.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 1949–50 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 
 124. Id. at 1950. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id. at 1950–51 (“It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allegations, rather 
than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of truth.”). 
 131. See id. at 1951–52 (finding that Iqbal’s complaint did not show that petitioners 
purposefully housed detainees in the maximum security unit on account of race, religion, or 
national origin, but rather that they sought “to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure 
conditions available” until they were cleared). 
 132. Id. at 1951 (explaining that the September 11 attacks were perpetrated by Arab 
Muslims and that a “legitimate policy” of law enforcement relating to individuals with 
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Iqbal contended that the Twombly standard only applied in antitrust 
cases.134  The Court, however, found that reading inconsistent with both 
Twombly and the Federal Rules:  “[Twombly] was based on our 
interpretation and application of Rule 8.  That Rule in turn governs the 
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States 
district courts.’  Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard 
for ‘all civil actions.’”135  Iqbal further contended that the Court’s reading 
of Rule 8 should be softened where the district court had received 
instructions to cabin discovery so as to preserve petitioners’ qualified 
immunity.136  The Court, however, again held that the question presented 
by a motion to dismiss did not turn on the controls placed upon the 
discovery process.137  Finally, Iqbal argued that the Federal Rules allowed 
him to allege the petitioners’ discriminatory intent generally, based on the 
language of Rule 9(b).138  The Court, however, rejected that “generally” 
equates with “conclusory”—as it had described Iqbal’s allegations—and 
instead explained that “generally” in the context of Rule 9 was a relative 
term used for comparison to the stricter pleading standards of that Rule; a 
general claim must still comport with the requirements of Rule 8.139
Justice Souter wrote for a four-Justice dissent.
 
140  The dissent first 
stressed the petitioners’ concession that actual knowledge of subordinate 
misconduct and deliberate indifference to it would expose them to 
liability.141  With this concession, the dissent argued, the “complaint 
satisfie[d] Rule 8(a)(2).”142  Instead, the petitioners had a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Twombly:  “Twombly does not require a court at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are 
probably true.  We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the 
allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.”143  Rather, 
the question was, assuming the truth of the factual allegations, whether the 
plaintiff had stated a plausible ground for relief.144
 
suspected links to the attacks would produce a “disparate, incidental impact” on Arab 
Muslims, even though the policy was intended to target “neither Arabs nor Muslims”). 
  The purpose of 
Twombly was to dispense with complaints that alleged conduct consistent 
 133. See id. at 1952. 
 134. See id. at 1953. 
 135. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 1953–54 (“Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is 
not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.”). 
 138. See id. at 1954; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 
 139. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (“Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the 
bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label ‘general allegation,’ and expect his 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.”). 
 140. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 141. See id. at 1954–57 (“Lest there be any mistake, . . . the majority is not narrowing the 
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”). 
 142. Id. at 1957–59. 
 143. Id. at 1959. 
 144. See id. 
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with both wrongdoing and lawful action; but here, the allegations reported 
activity that was “no[t] consistent with legal conduct.”145
The dissent did not believe that the majority had applied Twombly 
correctly.
 
146  Rather, it argued that all allegations must be read in the 
context of an entire complaint.147  Further, it criticized the majority’s 
inability to articulate what was and was not a conclusory statement, arguing 
that the examples of sufficiently factual allegations selected by the majority 
were indistinguishable from other, more “conclusory” allegations.148
In a separate dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for himself to defend 
the other procedural tools available to trial courts.
 
149  “Neither the briefs 
nor the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these 
alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in general or in the 
case before us.”150
Since Iqbal, the Supreme Court has not given further clarification as to 
the scope and meaning of Twombly’s holding.  Regardless of the dissents’ 
criticisms, Iqbal unequivocally extended the Twombly plausibility standard 
to all civil actions.
 
151  The lower courts quickly began to apply this standard 
in a variety of proceedings before them, although not consistently.152  
Following the Iqbal two-step analysis, federal courts now sometimes 
dismiss complaints for lacking sufficient factual allegations to show a 
plausible entitlement to relief.153
 
 145. See id. at 1960. 
 
 146. See id. at 1959–60. 
 147. See id. at 1960–61. 
 148. See id. at 1961. 
 149. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 1962. 
 151. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
 152. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir. 2007) (“In the 
wake of Twombly, courts and commentators have been grappling with the decision’s 
meaning and reach.”); Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170, 177 (D. Mass. 2009) 
(“Plausibility, in this view, is a relative measure.”); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 
1126–27 (acknowledging that plausibility pleading is in its “formative stages” and arguing 
that the courts would benefit from a consistent framework to help them determine the 
plausibility of a claim); Steinman, supra note 53, at 1357–60 (displaying the quick pace at 
which Twombly and Iqbal have been cited since their decision); Ryan Mize, Note, From 
Plausibility to Clarity:  An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible 
Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (2010) (“The primary disadvantages of current 
pleading doctrine are the inconsistency with which it is applied, its general lack of clarity, 
and its divergence from traditional liberal notice pleading.  The inconsistency leaves litigants 
guessing how the judiciary will construe ‘plausibility’ as to the allegations of their 
complaint.”). See generally Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly?  A Study 
on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1811 (2008). 
 153. See, e.g., Inst. for Dev. of Earth Awareness v. People for Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, No. 08 Civ. 6195(PKC), 2009 WL 2850230, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009); 
Kregler v. City of New York, 646 F. Supp. 2d 570, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated and 
remanded, 375 F. App’x 143 (2d Cir. 2010); Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 09 Civ. 
1397(CM), 2009 WL 1938987, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009). 
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The plausibility standard has received mixed reviews.154  The main 
public policy consideration underlying Twombly and Iqbal is the Court’s 
perception that notice pleading is insufficient to protect defendants against 
the high costs associated with modern discovery and litigation; in essence, 
notice pleading is no longer an efficient procedural tool.155  Some 
commentators support that policy,156 while others strongly rebuke it.157  
Congress has even been presented with bills designed to reinstate the 
Conley standard.158
 
 154. See generally Mark Herrmann et al., Debate, Plausible Denial:  Should Congress 
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (displaying arguments in 
support of and criticizing the Twombly standard). 
 
 155. See Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 1121 (“Integral to the Court’s new 
direction was that the public policy underlying traditional notice pleading no longer provided 
the appropriate balance necessary to promote justice and curb frivolous or highly speculative 
litigation.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (permitting a party to engage in discovery relating 
to any matter pertaining to its claims or defenses). 
 156. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473, 484–86 & n.62 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal are not dramatically out 
of line with previous precedent); Schwartz & Appel, supra note 34, at 1139–42 (“In the 
modern litigation world, the role of judges to screen the sufficiency of a complaint and 
ensure that juries are not led astray by misleading or immaterial information has never been 
more critical.  Twombly and Iqbal recognize that judges must be empowered to manage 
litigation at the pretrial level just as they are throughout other phases of litigation. . . . The 
distinguishing benefit of tightening controls at the pretrial stage is that it removes 
unsubstantiated claims at the most efficient point in the litigation process, namely the 
beginning.”); cf. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised:  A Comment 
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (supporting the “thin screening” 
model articulated in Twombly but arguing that the two-prong test of a pleading’s sufficiency 
described in Iqbal is more demanding and threatens to screen out meritorious claims, and 
further arguing that the Supreme Court is ill-equipped to design a stricter pleading 
standard—such a task should be conducted through the formal Rules Enabling Act process). 
 157. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading Standards on 
to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 274–84 (2009) (arguing that the 
plausibility standard threatens to violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by 
removing assessments of factual matters from a jury to the judge); Roger M. Michalski, 
Assessing Iqbal, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:44 AM), 
http://hlpronline.com/2010/12/assessing-iqbal (bemoaning the post-Iqbal legal landscape as 
one that keeps socially beneficial litigation out of the courts and contains an increased level 
of subjectivity comparable to the period before the plausibility standard came into effect); 
Miller, supra note 31, at 10–64 (“[Twombly and Iqbal] mark[] a continued retreat from the 
principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of litigant 
treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth. . . . [T]he decisions have 
unmoored our long-held understanding that the motion to dismiss simply tests a pleading’s 
notice-giving and substantive-law sufficiency. . . . Although discovery can be enormously 
expensive in a small percentage of federal cases, Twombly and Iqbal have stated a pleading 
rule that burdens all cases based on what may be happening in a small fraction of them.  For 
the great body of litigation, Twombly’s and Iqbal’s cure may be counterproductive and worse 
than the supposed disease.”). 
 158. See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.1504:; Open Access to Courts Act 
of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c111:H.R.4115:. 
2192 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
C.  Affirmative Defenses 
Rule 8, which Twombly interprets, does not only discuss the requirements 
for claims; it also discusses affirmative defenses.159  “An affirmative 
defense, under the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), is a defense that does 
not negate the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, but instead precludes 
liability even if all of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are proven.”160
1.  The Traditional Manner of Pleading Affirmative Defenses 
  
This section introduces the pleading standard for affirmative defenses in 
federal court, as it existed before Twombly.  It first discusses how 
defendants have traditionally pled affirmative defenses.  Then, it describes 
the standard to which affirmative defenses are held when they are 
challenged by Rule 12(f) motions to strike them from the pleadings. 
Prior to Twombly, generally stated affirmative defenses were usually 
sufficient so long as they provided fair notice of the nature of the 
defense.161  Courts held affirmative defenses to a flexible standard, which 
tended to resemble the Conley standard for claims.162  Nevertheless, most 
courts also respected the independence of Rule 8(c) in governing the 
pleading of affirmative defenses.163  Accordingly, defendants frequently 
pled simple lists or recitations of their defenses.164
 
 159. See supra note 35. 
  For instance, the court 
 160. Roberge v. Hannah Marine Corp., No. 96-1691, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21655, at *7 
(6th Cir. Aug. 13, 1997). 
 161. See Clem v. Corbeau, 98 F. App’x 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2004); Wyshak v. City Nat’l 
Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The key to determining the sufficiency of 
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.”); 
Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *2 (N.D. 
Okla. June 9, 2010) (citing many decisions to so hold); see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1274 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A]n 
affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be held to be sufficient, and 
therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long as it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the 
nature of the defense.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 & n.27 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Rule 8(e)’s language that “requir[es] all pleadings to be ‘simple, concise, and direct’” to 
conclude that its pleading standard for affirmative defenses is the same standard to which 
claims are held); FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02CV4786GBD, 2005 WL 475986, at 
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2005) (asserting that an affirmative defense should not be struck 
unless it seems certain that the plaintiffs will prevail “despite any state of facts which could 
be proved in support of the [affirmative] defense”—effectively the same standard used to 
examine claims under Conley). 
 163. See, e.g., Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 657 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Rule 8(b) 
does not apply when a defendant asserts an affirmative defense . . . .”); Bernal v. Daewoo 
Motor Am., Inc., No. CV09-1502 PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3837195, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 16, 
2009) (“Rule 8(b), however, does not apply to affirmative defenses. . . . The Court will not 
strike [defendant’s] affirmative defenses on the ground that they do not comply with Rule 
8(b).”); Gen. Electric Capital Corp. v. Lanmann, No. 2:05-CV-1130, 2006 WL 2077103, at 
*2 (S.D. Ohio July 24, 2006) (“[I]t is settled that ‘Rule 8(b) does not apply when a defendant 
asserts an affirmative defense.’” (quoting Pollock, 845 F.2d at 657 n.1)). But see Shinew v. 
Wszola, Civil Action No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009). 
 164. See Romantine v. CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-973, 2009 WL 
3417469, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2009); Miller, supra note 31, at 101 (“[D]efensive 
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in Woodfield v. Bowman165 stated that a defendant must plead an 
affirmative defense with “enough specificity or factual particularity to give 
the plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the defense that is being advanced;” however, in 
some instances, “merely pleading the name of the affirmative defense . . . 
may be sufficient.”166  The courts may have allowed the liberal pleading of 
affirmative defenses because a defendant risks waiving any affirmative 
defense that it does not plead.167
For an example of how the federal courts handled affirmative defenses 
before Twombly, consider Davis v. Sun Oil Co.,
 
168 a U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit decision from 1998.  Davis involved a dispute over a 
sale of land by defendant Sun Oil to the Davises, which land was formerly 
used as a gasoline filling station.169  Sun Oil did not properly remove 
underground equipment before the sale and the Davises brought actions in 
both state and federal court on account of the omission.170  The federal 
action for environmental damage was stayed pending the state action for 
breach of contract and fraud, in which the Davises were victorious.171
The Sixth Circuit found that Sun Oil did not acquiesce to the Davises’ 
claim splitting and thereby waive its res judicata defense in the federal 
action, because Sun Oil had stated in its answer that “[p]laintiffs’ claims are 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”
 
172  The majority held that Sun Oil 
could rely upon that succinctly stated affirmative defense; the plaintiffs had 
not been treated unjustly and had been given fair notice of the defense.173
Judge Danny Julian Boggs, however, dissented in part from the 
majority’s decision based on his belief that Sun Oil’s pleading of res 
judicata was insufficient.
 
174  The dissent noted the boilerplate nature of the 
defense.175  Conceding that there was no technical form of pleading 
required, the dissent argued that pleading in an “intelligible manner” is not 
formalism.176
 
pleading[s] typically are alleged in a formulary, conclusory, and uninformative fashion along 
the style illustrated in Form 30 [of the Federal Rules].”). 
  Sun Oil’s “cloudy answer” did not suffice to supply fair 
 165. 193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 166. Id. at 362 & n.27 (citing Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Napoli, 166 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 
1948) (“Under our very liberal rules of pleading . . . .  [a] plea that simply states that 
complainant was guilty of contributory negligence, as in the case at bar, is sufficient.”)). 
 167. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77083, at *19–20 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); see also Wanamaker v. Albrecht, No. 95-
8061, 1996 WL 582738, at *5 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 1996) (“While counsel often plead vast 
numbers of affirmative defenses without being sure whether the facts will ultimately support 
the defenses, such pleading is done precisely so that the defenses will be preserved should 
discovery or further proceedings reveal factual support.”); Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 
10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010). 
 168. 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 169. See id. at 608. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. at 608–09. 
 172. See id. at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 173. See id. at 612–13. 
 174. See id. at 613 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 175. See id. at 614. 
 176. See id. 
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notice of its objection to the Davises’ separate state and federal actions.177  
“The prejudice to the Davises is obvious.”178
2.  Judicial Assessment of the Sufficiency of Affirmative Defense 
Pleadings:  Rule 12(f) Motions To Strike 
 
The Federal Rules do provide some recourse to plaintiffs who wish to 
remove inappropriate affirmative defenses from an answer.  Rule 12(f) 
allows a party to move the court to strike affirmative defenses from an 
opponent’s pleading.179  This can allow the court and parties to avoid 
spending time and money litigating spurious issues.180
Traditionally, the courts grant motions to strike when the plaintiff would 
succeed despite any pled or inferable set of facts in support of the 
challenged defense.
 
181  In other words, an affirmative defense is insufficient 
if it is not recognized as a valid defense against the claim.182  However, 
when reviewing a motion to strike, the court must view the pleading under 
attack in the light most favorable to the pleader.183  An affirmative defense 
will not be struck unless its insufficiency is clearly apparent, it does not 
present relevant questions of law or fact, and its retention is prejudicial to 
the moving party.184  Prejudice may be displayed if the answer does not 
clearly articulate to which claim an affirmative defense applies, or if an 
affirmative defense has no possible relation to the controversy.185
 
 177. See id. 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient 
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.  The court may act:  
(1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, 
if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.”). 
 180. See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4 
(W.D. Va. June 24, 2010); Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 
718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enters., 
Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 402 (D. Del. 2009) (“Motions to strike serve ‘to clean up the 
pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.’” 
(quoting McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa. 
2002))); Fogel v. Linnemann (In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc.), No. 07 B 20870, No. 08 
A 55, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2495, at *8–9 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Motions to strike 
can be useful, however, as a way to remove unnecessary clutter from the case, and then they 
serve to expedite, not delay.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 181. See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Pennsalt Chems.Corp., 262 F. Supp. 101, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1967). 
 182. See Huertas v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-3959 (RBK/JS), 2009 WL 2132429, at 
*1 (D.N.J. July 13, 2009). 
 183. See Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 71 (S.D. W. Va. 1993). 
 184. See id. at 70; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 
1986), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *2; 
Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009); 5C WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 161, § 1381. 
 185. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th 
Cir. 1953); Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77083, at *14 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. 
Supp. 2d 687, 689 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Benjamin v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 1:08-cv-101, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48677, at *1–2 (D.V.I. June 4, 2009); Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook 
Co., No. 08-cv-335-jps, 2008 WL 4443805, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“Failing to 
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Rule 12(f) motions to strike are generally disfavored, and courts 
frequently characterize them as “time wasters” that potentially serve only to 
delay a proceeding.186  Moreover, a motion to strike is a drastic remedy and 
should not be used frequently, in part because of the difficulty of deciding 
cases without a factual record,187 as well as the strong policy favoring 
resolution on the merits.188  Accordingly, a defendant whose defense has 
been struck is normally granted leave to amend.189
II.  DOES THE TWOMBLY STANDARD EXTEND TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES? 
 
As this Note discussed earlier, the courts in Shinew190 and First 
National191 both use Davis192 as precedent, but to very different results.193
 
properly notify is prejudice.”); Westbrook v. Paragon Sys., Inc., Civil Action 07-0714-WS-
C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *2–3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007). 
  
After Twombly, the continued validity of the traditional manners of 
pleading affirmative defenses and determining their sufficiency are in 
doubt.  Building upon the discussion in Part I of the Federal Rules and 
pleading standards, Part II explores the arguments presented by the district 
courts for either extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses or 
not.  First, it considers those courts that have decided that the Twombly 
standard does extend to affirmative defenses.  Part II.A.I discusses the 
notions of fairness presented by these courts in extending Twombly.  Part 
II.A.2 discusses the policy justifications for extending the Twombly 
standard, including preventing discovery abuse and limiting boilerplate 
defensive pleadings.  Finally, Part II.A.3 describes the efforts of these 
courts to temper the potential harshness of their rulings to extend the 
Twombly standard by allowing leave to amend.  This part then considers 
those courts that have decided that the Twombly standard does not extend to 
affirmative defenses.  Part II.B.1 discusses these courts’ reading of Rule 8, 
upon which they heavily rely in their decisions not to extend Twombly.  Part 
II.B.2 discusses the other Federal Rules, policy considerations, and notions 
 186. See Greenheck, 2008 WL 4443805, at *1 (“[A] motion to strike pleadings or 
affirmative defenses is generally disfavored because it consumes scarce judicial resources, 
and potentially serve[s] to delay . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 
2225668, at *1 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008) (listing many decisions to so describe); 5C WRIGHT 
& MILLER, supra note 161, § 1380. 
 187. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 201 F.2d at 822 (“Partly because of the 
practical difficulty of deciding cases without a factual record it is well established that the 
action of striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts.  It is a drastic remedy to 
be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.” (citation omitted)); Knit With 
v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 08-4221, 08-4775, 2009 WL 973492, at *6 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 8, 2009). 
 188. See Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 
1167, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 189. See Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 232 (E.D.N.C. 2010); 
Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *15; Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *2. 
 190. See supra notes 1–7, 14–20 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 168–78. 
 193. See supra notes 8–20 and accompanying text. 
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of fairness that influence these courts’ reasoning.  Lastly, Part II.B.3 
addresses those courts that have remained silent on the issue, but whose 
silence implies reluctance to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative 
defenses. 
A.  The Twombly Standard Does Extend to Affirmative Defenses 
The majority of courts that have considered the question have found that 
the Twombly standard does extend to affirmative defenses.194  However, 
this is not to say that they have all ruled similarly; even within this subset, 
there is some variation.  For example, where an affirmative defense must 
display multiple elements to prove eventually successful, some courts have 
not required each of those elements to be supported with factual allegations, 
while other courts have dismissed affirmative defenses composed of many 
elements for failure to support each.195
This section describes the major points upon which the district courts that 
extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses rely.  First, it discusses 
judicial notions of fairness in decisions to extend the standard.  Next, it 
addresses the use of the Twombly standard to prevent discovery abuse and 
boilerplate defensive pleadings.  Finally, it describes judicial liberality in 
allowing defendants to amend insufficient defensive pleadings. 
 
1.  What Is Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander 
The seeming unfairness of applying a different standard of pleading to 
claims and affirmative defenses drives many courts to reason that the two 
standards should be the same.196  Because affirmative defenses are 
pleadings, they are subject to the same requirements as any other 
pleading.197
 
 194. See Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 
1167, 1171 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2010).  At least one commentator supports extension. See 
Mize, supra note 152, at 1260–61. 
  To reach this conclusion, some courts rely upon precedent that 
 195. Compare Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *8 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (“As Plaintiff points out, a successful claim of laches or equitable 
estoppel requires many elements.  However, at the pleading stage, the burden is far less; 
Defendant need only meet the requirements of Rule 8.” (citation omitted)), with T-Mobile 
USA, Inc. v. Wireless Exclusive USA, LLC, No. 3:08-CV-0340-G, 2008 WL 2600016, at *3 
(N.D. Tex. July 1, 2008) (“The defendants have failed to sufficiently allege the fourth 
element [of an antitrust anti-tying affirmative defense]; consequently, the defense is 
insufficient as a matter of law and is stricken . . . .”). 
 196. See Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Palmer 
v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *4–5 (W.D. Va. June 24, 
2010). 
 197. See OSF Healthcare Sys. v. Banno, No. 08-CV-1096, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7584, 
at *2–3 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (“[Affirmative defenses] are subject to all pleading 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Affirmative defenses thus must be set 
forth in short and plain statement[s] . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . . 
[Twombly and Iqbal are] equally applicable to affirmative defenses, given that affirmative 
defenses are subject to those same pleading requirements.” (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Greenheck Fan Corp. v. Loren Cook Co., No. 
08-cv-335-jps, 2008 WL 4443805, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2008) (“Because affirmative 
defenses are pleadings, they are governed by Rule 8’s requirement of a short and plain 
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suggests that affirmative defenses are judged by the same pleading 
requirements as complaints.198  “[T]he purpose of pleading requirements is 
the same. . . . [The] standard simply means than [sic] that it be pleaded in a 
way that is intelligible, gives fair notice, and is plausibly suggested by the 
facts.”199  “[W]hat is good for the goose is good for the gander . . . .”200
The courts’ problem with some tersely phrased affirmative defenses is 
that they do not provide plaintiffs with fair notice of the defenses.
 
201  It is 
not the responsibility of the court or the opposing party to interpret what a 
defendant meant by tersely worded affirmative defenses.202
 
statement of the defense.” (citing Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 
1294 (7th Cir. 1989))); Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (holding that 
because the Rules “require affirmative defenses to be pleaded” then the “pleading specificity 
standard” articulated by Twombly applies); Fogel v. Linnemann (In re Mission Bay Ski & 
Bike, Inc.), No. 07 B 20870, No. 08 A 55, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2495, at *15–16 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Affirmative defenses are pleadings and so are subject to all pleading 
requirements under the Federal Rules.  That means affirmative defenses must meet the 
notice-pleading standards of Rule 8(a) as the Supreme Court recently interpreted them in 
[Twombly and Iqbal].” (citations omitted)). 
  “An even-
 198. See Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Lush Boutique, L.L.C., No. 09-6381, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16392, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2010) (“The Fifth Circuit held in Woodfield v. 
Bowman that an affirmative defense is subject to the same pleading requirements as the 
Complaint.” (citing Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354, 362 (5th Cir. 1999))); Tracy v. 
NVR, Inc., No. 04-CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (citing 
FSP, Inc. v. Societe Generale, No. 02CV4786GBD, 2005 WL 475986, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
28, 2005) (suggesting that a motion to strike an affirmative defense under Rule 12(f) is 
governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) by 
asserting that an affirmative defense should not be struck unless it seems certain that the 
plaintiffs will prevail “despite any state of facts which could be proved in support of the 
[affirmative] defense”—effectively the same standard used to examine claims under 
Conley); Solvent Chem. Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 196, 212 
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[t]he standard for striking an affirmative defense is the 
mirror image” of that which is used to determine whether a pleading has failed to state a 
claim)); Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 16, 2009) (citing Woodfield in a manner similar to Cosmetic Warriors); Aspex 
Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying 
upon Societe Generale in a manner similar to Tracy); Stoffels, 2008 WL 4391396, at *1 
(citing Woodfield in a manner similar to Cosmetic Warriors); T-Mobile USA, 2008 WL 
2600016, at *2 (using Woodfield in a manner similar to Cosmetic Warriors). 
 199. Palmer, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (“Such a requirement is in no way inconsistent 
with Rule 8(a)(2)’s ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ language.  Likewise, is neither 
inconsistent with Rule 8(b)(1)(A)’s requirement that a defendant ‘state in short and plain 
terms its defenses to each claim’ nor with Rule 8(d)(1)’s requirement that all pleadings be 
‘simple, concise, and direct.’”); see also Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 
650 (D. Kan. 2009) (“In both instances, the purpose of pleading requirements is to provide 
enough notice to the opposing party that indeed there is some plausible, factual basis for the 
assertion and not simply a suggestion of possibility that it may apply to the case.”). 
 200. Racick, 270 F.R.D. at 233. 
 201. See Burget v. Capital W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *3 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009); see also FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, No. 08-
81536-CIV, 2009 WL 2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (“Although Rule 8 does not 
obligate a defendant to set forth detailed factual allegations, a defendant must give the 
plaintiff ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the defense and the grounds upon which it rests.”); 
Greenheck, 2008 WL 4443805, at *2. 
 202. See CTF Dev., Inc. v. Penta Hospitality, LLC, No. C 09-02429 WHA, 2009 WL 
3517617, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2009). 
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handed standard as related to pleadings ensures that the affirmative defenses 
supply enough information to explain the parameters of and basis for an 
affirmative defense such that the adverse party can reasonably tailor 
discovery.”203  Because the rationale of Twombly impacts both parties to a 
dispute, it makes sense to extend the standard.204
Furthermore, the similarities in language between Rule 8(a) and Rule 
8(b) indicates to some courts that the pleading standard of affirmative 
defenses is the same as that for complaints.
 
205  To these courts, the 
language of Rule 8(c) is not independent of the other sections of Rule 8, but 
rather imposes additional requirements upon the pleading of affirmative 
defenses on top of those imposed by Rule 8(b)’s “short and plain terms” 
language.206
2.  Discovery Abuse and Boilerplate Pleadings 
 
In addition to reliance upon notions of simple fairness, courts that decide 
to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses frequently do so 
“[b]ecause of the widespread abuse of affirmative defenses and related 
judicial acquiescence at times in such practices.”207  These courts tend to 
pursue two objectives:  the prevention of unnecessary discovery and the 
streamlining of boilerplate defensive pleadings.208
Some district courts have hearkened to the “underlying rationale” of 
Twombly in their decisions to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative 
defenses.
 
209
 
 203. Burget, 2009 WL 4807619, at *2. 
  To these courts, Twombly is designed to eliminate the 
potential high costs of discovery associated with meritless claims, and 
“[b]oilerplate affirmative defenses . . . can have the same detrimental effect 
 204. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at 
*17 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010). 
 205. See, e.g., HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 
2010); see also supra note 35. 
 206. See Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 (D. Kan. 2009) 
(“Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 is consistent in at least inferring that the pleading requirements for 
affirmative defenses are essentially the same as for claims for relief.  Although Rule 8(c) for 
affirmative defenses does not contain the same language as 8(a)(2), requiring ‘a short and 
plain statement of the claim,’ 8(b)(1)(A) nevertheless does require a defendant to ‘state in 
short and plain terms its defenses to each claim.’  The sub-heading for Rule 8(b)(1), 
moreover, is ‘Defenses; In General.’  Rule 8(c)(1) provides a helpful laundry list of 
commonly asserted affirmative defenses to emphasize that avoidances and affirmative 
defenses must indeed be pleaded to be preserved.  Applying the standard for heightened 
pleading to affirmative defenses serves a valid purpose in requiring at least some valid 
factual basis for pleading an affirmative defense and not adding it to the case simply upon 
some conjecture that it may somehow apply.”). 
 207. See United States v. Quadrini, No. 2:07-CV-13227, 2007 WL 4303213, at *6 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 6, 2007). 
 208. See Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 2010) 
(“‘[B]oilerplate defenses clutter the docket and . . . create unnecessary work’ and extend[] 
discovery.” (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 
2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008))). 
 209. See HCRI TRS, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 691; see also supra note 155 and accompanying 
text. 
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on the cost of litigation.”210  In this view, if an affirmative defense is 
unnecessary, then discovery in support of it is wasteful and, therefore, a 
plaintiff should not have to wait to find out whether it has merit.211  Just as 
Twombly considered the burdens of discovery related to non-meritorious 
claims, these courts considered the burden of discovery related to non-
meritorious defenses.212
Similarly, these courts take a practical approach to their decisions, using 
the Twombly standard as a tool through which they might clear their 
dockets or improve the quality of the pleadings before them.
 
213  These 
courts require attorneys before them to “accept a continuing obligation to 
eliminate unnecessary boilerplate in their pleadings.”214  Claims and 
defenses not currently sustainable under Rule 11 are “frivolous” and should 
be stricken.215  These courts “require[] more than the assertion of any and 
all defenses that may apply.  Such defenses fall within the ambit of 
Twombly and [these courts’] preferred practice . . . .”216
3.  Amending Pleadings 
 
The courts that extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses for 
fairness and policy reasons usually permit amendment of the answer217
 
 210. HCRI TRS, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
 to 
 211. See Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 
(W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (“[Plaintiffs should] not be left to the formal discovery process to 
find-out whether the defense exists and may, instead, use the discovery process for its 
intended purpose of ascertaining the additional facts which support a well-pleaded claim or 
defense.”); FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, No. 08-81536-CIV, 2009 WL 
2488302, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009) (“‘On the other hand, weeding out legally 
insufficient defenses at an early stage of a complicated lawsuit may be extremely valuable to 
all concerned in order to avoid the needless expenditures of time and money in litigating 
issues which can be seen to have no bearing on the outcome.’” (quoting First Specialty Ins. 
Corp. v. GRS Mgmt. Assocs., No. 08-81356-CIV, 2009 WL 2169869, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 
20, 2009))). 
 212. See, e.g., Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77083, at *23–24, *27 n.8 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (“This manner of pleading serves to 
narrow the issues for discovery and propels the litigation forward so that the Court may 
swiftly and efficiently hear the merits of a plaintiff’s claims.”); Barnes v. AT&T Pension 
Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding 
prejudice to the plaintiff in the continued existence of the affirmative defenses in the 
pleadings, because the plaintiff would need to conduct discovery that would be “expensive 
and potentially unnecessary and irrelevant”). 
 213. See, e.g., Safeco, 2008 WL 2558015, at *1(“Boilerplate defenses clutter the docket 
and, further, create unnecessary work.  Opposing counsel generally must respond to such 
defenses with interrogatories or other discovery aimed at ascertaining which defenses are 
truly at issue and which are merely asserted without factual basis but in an abundance of 
caution.  The court is aware of only a limited class of defenses that are waived if not 
immediately asserted.  Rule 15 allows for appropriate amendments and counsel should 
therefore feel no need in this court to window-dress pleadings early for fear of losing 
defenses later.”). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. (extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses without analysis). 
 217. See supra note 5. 
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allow defendants the opportunity to satisfy the more rigorous standard.218  
The liberal application of Rule 15 motions to amend is designed to “soften[] 
any painful blow” caused by the extension.219  The courts recognize that 
parties do not always know all the facts relevant to their claims or defenses 
until discovery has occurred.220  While that is not usually enough to 
overcome a Rule 12(f) motion to strike,221 the Federal Rules contemplate 
such circumstances by allowing for amendment upon the acquisition of 
additional relevant information.222
B.  The Twombly Standard Does Not Extend to Affirmative Defenses 
 
A sizable minority of courts that have considered whether the Twombly 
standard extends to affirmative defenses have found that it does not.223
1.  Rule 8 Differentiates Between Claims and Affirmative Defenses 
  
This section discusses the most common arguments of these courts.  First, it 
explores judicial interpretation of Rule 8.  Next, it considers other Rules, 
policy, and judicial concepts of fairness that influence courts’ reasoning.  
Finally, it examines those courts that have selected not to rule upon the 
controversy when presented with the opportunity, but whose refusal to rule 
suggests that they are reluctant to extend the Twombly standard. 
The most prevalent argument against extending the Twombly standard to 
affirmative defenses is based upon the language and structure of Rule 8.224  
Rule 8(a) governs the pleading of complaints and requires “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”225
 
 218. See, e.g., Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 652 (D. Kan. 2009) 
(“The majority of cases applying the Twombly pleading standard to affirmative defenses and 
striking those defenses have permitted the defendant leave to amend.”). 
  
In contrast, Rule 8(c) specifies “only that affirmative defenses be ‘set forth 
 219. See Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at 
*25 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010). 
 220. See Teirstein v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 6:08cv14, 2009 WL 704138, at *8 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 16, 2009) (declining to strike an affirmative defense of limitation of damages because, 
at that point in the litigation, the plaintiff had not provided any details regarding his 
damages); see also Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (declining to 
strike an affirmative defense of statute of limitations and suggesting that the court was 
persuaded by defendant’s argument that it could not provide detailed factual allegations in its 
pleading because plaintiffs had not specifically alleged when the claim had occurred).  The 
Stoffels court noted that the statute of limitations affirmative defense “is largely self-
explanatory and is sufficient to give plaintiffs fair notice” of the asserted defense. See id.at 
*2.  In similar scenarios, other courts have stricken the affirmative defense with leave to 
amend. See, e.g., Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 651–52.  However, some courts have not. See, e.g., 
Burget v. Capital W. Sec. Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *3–4 (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 8, 2009) (striking with prejudice an affirmative defense of statute of limitations, 
despite defendant’s argument that it had insufficient information regarding plaintiff’s claims 
to determine whether they were time-barred). 
 221. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 222. See Hayne, 263 F.R.D. at 651. 
 223. See Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *19–21. 
 224. See supra note 35 (reproducing FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
 225. See supra note 35. 
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affirmatively.’”226  Rule 8(c) does not require that the answer “show” that 
the defendant is entitled to prevail on his affirmative defense.227  Moreover, 
Twombly was decided under Rule 8(a) and its language does not suggest 
that its standard was intended to extend to affirmative defenses under Rule 
8(c).228  Accordingly, both the structure and language of the Federal Rules 
contemplate different treatment of claims and affirmative defenses.  Many 
courts have used similar reasoning to conclude that the Twombly standard 
does not extend to affirmative defenses.229
For example, the court in Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.
 
230
Twombly interpreted Rule 8(a)(2), which states that a pleading must 
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.”  Rule 8(c)(1), which provides for affirmative 
defenses, states only that “a party must affirmatively state any avoidance 
or affirmative defense.”  There is no requirement under Rule 8(c) that a 
defendant “show” any facts at all.
 
held for largely textual reasons that the Twombly standard did not extend to 
affirmative defenses: 
231
 
 226. Westbrook v. Paragon Sys., Inc., No. 07-0714-WS-C, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490, 
at *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)).  Although Westbrook quoted a 
previous version of Rule 8(c), the substance remains the same. See supra text accompanying 
note 32. 
 
 227. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764 (PJS/AJB), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2010) (highlighting that an affirmative 
defense is not a claim for relief and that no Federal Rule requires a defendant to plead “facts 
‘showing’ that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief”); Westbrook, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88490, at *2. 
 228. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 & n.3 (2007); Westbrook, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *2. 
 229. See, e.g., Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10cv1218 (JCC), 2011 
WL 98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (“Such policy considerations [as relied upon by 
courts to extend the Twombly standard] may be compelling, but whether this Court agrees 
with them or not, it is first bound to apply the relevant rules of civil procedure as written.”); 
Ameristar Fence Prods., Inc. v. Phoenix Fence Co., No. CV-10-299-PHX-DGC, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 81468, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2010) (stressing the individuality of Rule 8(c) 
in its governance of affirmative defenses, emphasizing that that Rule requires only that a 
party “state” an avoidance or affirmative defense, and declining to extend the Twombly 
standard to affirmative defenses, leaving such an action “to the Supreme Court or this 
Circuit”); McLemore v. Regions Bank, Nos. 3:08-cv-0021, 3:08-cv-1003, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25785, at *42–49 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2010) (discussing how the Twombly and 
Iqbal decisions only concerned themselves with plaintiffs’ complaints and Rule 8(a)(2), and 
holding that affirmative defenses are not required to plead supporting facts); Romantine v. 
CH2M Hill Eng’rs, Inc., No. 09-973, 2009 WL 3417469, at *1 & n.1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 
2009) (reasoning that, despite any similarities between the language of Rule 8(a) and 8(b), 
affirmative defenses are governed by Rule 8(c), and holding that the Supreme court in 
Twombly was interpreting the pleading requirements for claims under Rule 8(a)(2) only); 
Am. Res. Ins. Co. v. Evoleno Co., No. 07-0035-WS-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55181, at *6 
n.7 (S.D. Ala. July 30, 2007) (emphasizing that the “showing” element of Rule 8(a) is that 
which requires some factual allegation, while neither Rule 8(b) nor Rule 8(c) requires the 
answer to “show” that the defendant is entitled to prevail on its affirmative defense). 
 230. No. 01-119, 2009 WL 4981730 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009). 
 231. Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 
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Under this interpretation of the law, the court upheld all of the defendants’ 
challenged affirmative defenses, finding that a defendant is not required to 
allege facts in support of an affirmative defense.232
2.  Other Rules, Policy Considerations, and Fairness 
 
The language of Rule 8 is not the only concern for those district courts 
that have declined to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.  
Courts have also relied upon other Federal Rules, policy considerations, and 
notions of simple fairness to defendants in their decisions not to extend the 
Twombly standard. 
The Federal Rules provide plaintiffs with several protections from 
defendants who poorly craft affirmative defenses.  Hearkening to Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Twombly,233 the court in Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, 
Inc.234 reasoned that when an affirmative defense does not provide enough 
facts to give fair notice of the claim for the plaintiff to respond properly, a 
motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is not the appropriate remedy.235  The 
court suggested that if a pleading fails to specify allegations so as to provide 
sufficient notice or does not contain enough information to allow for a 
responsive pleading to be framed, the proper motion to file is a Rule 12(e) 
motion for a more definite statement.236  While the court did apply 
Twombly to the affirmative defenses before it, it only did so as far as its 
interpretation of that standard reconciled with notice pleading of affirmative 
defenses, denying plaintiff’s motion to strike and granting in the alternative 
a motion for a more definite statement.237
Similarly, the Federal Rules require that factual contentions made to a 
court have evidentiary support or will likely so have after “reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”
  In other words, the Federal 
Rules already provided a means of questioning the language of an 
affirmative defense. 
238  Failure to satisfy 
these conditions can result in sanctions for attorneys, law firms, and 
parties.239  Both parties must make “an inquiry reasonable under the 
circumstances” before making presentations to the court.240
 
 232. See id. at *5–6. 
  However, the 
time that is available to make these inquiries differs for a plaintiff, under the 
 233. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 234. No. 07-80551-CIV, 2008 WL 2225668 (S.D. Fla. May 29, 2008). 
 235. See id. at *2. 
 236. See id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite 
statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.  The motion must be made 
before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the 
details desired.  If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed 
within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike 
the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.”). 
 237. See Holtzman, 2008 WL 2225668, at *2. 
 238. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
 239. See id. 11(c).  
 240. See id. 11(b). 
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applicable statute of limitations, and for a defendant, under the Federal 
Rules.241  District courts have reasoned that these differences justify 
different treatment of plaintiffs and defendants at the pleading stage.242  To 
these courts, it is unfair to extend the Twombly standard to defendants when 
a plaintiff has months or years to investigate a claim before pleading, while 
a defendant “typically has [twenty-one] days to serve an answer.”243
Practical considerations have also influenced courts’ decisions not to 
extend the Twombly standard.  Because of the limited time available to 
them, defendants have frequently simply listed their affirmative defenses in 
their answer.
 
244  Some courts view these listings as tools of the trade and 
would select not to penalize defendants by striking pleadings that are 
allowed under the Rules.245  In a typical case, it becomes apparent which 
affirmative defenses are not viable, and the parties disregard them; “[n]o 
judicial intervention is necessary.”246  Extending the Twombly standard to 
affirmative defenses may compel defendants to move the court more 
frequently for permission to amend its answer after discovery to add 
affirmative defenses.247  Plaintiffs would naturally resist those motions, and 
this could lead to another round of motion practice, in many cases 
“increasing the burdens on the federal courts, and adding expense and delay 
for the parties.”248
 
 241. See id. 12(a)(1)(A) (“A defendant must serve an answer:  (i) within 21 days after 
being served with the summons and complaint . . . .”). 
 
 242. See, e.g., Holdbrook v. Saia Motor Freight Line, LLC, No. 09-cv-02870-LTB-BNB, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29377, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2010) (“[I]t is reasonable to impose 
stricter pleading requirements on a plaintiff who has significantly more time to develop 
factual support for his claims than a defendant who is only given 20 days to respond to a 
complaint and assert its affirmative defenses.”). 
 243. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, No. 09-CV-2764 (PJS/AJB), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2010) (“Whatever one thinks of Iqbal and 
Twombly, the ‘plausibility’ requirement that they impose is more fairly imposed on plaintiffs 
who have years to investigate than on defendants who have 21 days.”). 
 244. See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Wells Fargo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *5 (arguing that extending the 
Twombly standard would “radically change” federal civil practice, because affirmative 
defenses are almost always simply listed in answers). 
 246. Id. at *6; see also Westbrook v. Paragon Sys., Inc., No. 07-0714-WS-C, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 88490, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2007) (“The Court fully expects the defendant 
to isolate those defenses that are truly affirmative and that are legitimately at issue without 
wasting the time of the Court or the plaintiff.”). 
 247. See Wells Fargo, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114983, at *6. 
 248. Id.; see also Miller, supra note 31, at 89, 102–03 (“Once again, sounding a 
pragmatic note, there are potential litigation cost and delay consequences to these 
amendment questions.  If Rule 15 does survive unscathed, the growing number of dismissal-
motion grants will generate additional amendment requests and grants of leave to replead, 
and in many instances a second motion to dismiss following that repleading.  On the other 
hand, if the application of Rule 15 is narrowed, more judgments following Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissals will be entered and additional appeals from denials of dismissals and leave to 
replead are likely to result. . . . In reality, any increase in the burden of pleading . . . the 
plausibility of denials and affirmative defenses, also would cause cost and delay 
consequences that would have to be considered in determining whether efficiency and cost 
savings actually were being realized from the shift to plausibility pleading.”). 
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3.  Courts Have Been Reluctant To Extend the Twombly Standard to 
Affirmative Defenses 
Subsequent to Twombly and Iqbal, some district courts, faced with an 
opportunity to decisively rule on the issue of this Note, have declined to do 
so.249  The reasoning of these courts frequently suggests that they do not 
believe that the Twombly standard should extend to affirmative defenses in 
a Draconian way.250
For example, in Voeks v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
 
251 the court was asked to 
decide a motion to strike a laundry list of affirmative defenses.  The 
plaintiff argued that the Twombly standard applied and the defendant, citing 
Woodfield,252 claimed that a succinctly stated affirmative defense could 
provide appropriate notice.253  The court, however, did not agree that there 
was an issue in controversy on this point at all:  “Despite the arguments of 
the parties to the contrary, the pleading requirements outlined in Twombly 
and Woodfield are not materially different.”254
Specific facts, the court found, were not necessary under either standard, 
and both existed only to give fair notice; the factual specificity required to 
give notice, “if any,” depended on the circumstance of the parties and the 
specific pleading.
 
255  The court upheld several affirmative defenses, despite 
a lack of detail in the pleading, because they were “largely self-
explanatory.”256  Next, the court upheld affirmative defenses that 
“sufficiently inform[ed]” the plaintiff of the issues raised because “[i]t 
would not be reasonable to expect the defendant to have detailed 
information about [the affirmative defenses] at this early stage of the 
litigation.”257
 
 249. See, e.g., Del-Nat Tire Corp. v. A to Z Tire & Battery, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-02457-JPM-
tmp, 2009 WL 4884435, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2009) (declining to address the issue); 
Schlottman v. Unit Drilling Co., No. Civ-08-1275-C, 2009 WL 1764855, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
June 18, 2009) (declining to address whether the Twombly standard extends to affirmative 
defenses); Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Nos. 08-4221, 08-4775, 2009 WL 973492, at 
*10–11 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2009) (selecting not to address Twombly’s applicability to 
affirmative defenses despite plaintiffs’ motion to strike an affirmative defense on grounds of 
“factual insufficiency,” but rather applying a traditional standard of review for a Rule 12(f) 
motion to strike and concluding that the court could not find that there existed no set of facts 
under which the affirmative defense could succeed—an application of the Conley standard). 
  The court did strike several equitable affirmative defenses 
 250. See, e.g., Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 
2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (deciding on defendant’s contested motion to 
amend without holding that Twombly is the correct standard by which affirmative defenses 
are to be judged); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 402, 
407 n.8 (D. Del. 2009) (acknowledging that the parties’ contentions present an opportunity 
for the court to resolve the issue, but declining to apply the Twombly standard to the 
contested affirmative defenses while instead effectively applying the notice standard). 
 251. No. 07-C-0030, 2008 WL 89434 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 2008). 
 252. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *6. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. (denying motions to strike affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, 
mistake, no damages, speculative damages, insufficient intent, and standing). 
 257. Id. (denying motions to strike affirmative defenses of offset and failure to mitigate). 
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for failing to provide the plaintiff with fair notice, because the allegations in 
the answer did not support each element of the defenses.258  On these 
affirmative defenses, the court granted leave to amend.259
III.  COURTS SHOULD NOT EXTEND THE TWOMBLY STANDARD TO 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
  By ruling in such 
a manner, the Voeks court allowed itself to continue using its pre-Twombly 
standard for determining the sufficiency of affirmative defenses. 
The previous part examined the major arguments put forward by the 
courts in deciding whether to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative 
defenses.  This part shows that those courts that have decided not to extend 
the Twombly standard have plotted the better course.  First, it demonstrates 
how the language and structure of the Federal Rules do not support an 
extension.  Next, it shows how the precedents relied upon by those courts 
selecting to extend the Twombly standard are insufficient to justify their 
decisions.  Then, it explains how an extension of the standard will increase 
the costs and time associated with litigation.  Finally, this part argues that 
simple fairness does not warrant an extension of the Twombly standard to 
affirmative defenses. 
A.  The Rules Do Not Follow 
The Federal Rules themselves, in both structure and language, 
contemplate different treatment of pleadings by claimants and defendants.  
Rule 8, governing the general rules for pleadings, explicitly differentiates 
between claims for relief and affirmative defenses.260
The arguments justifying the extension of the Twombly standard to 
affirmative defenses under Rule 8(c) based upon the sparse similarity 
between the language of Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 8(b)(1) are incoherent.
 
261  
While Rule 8(b)(1) does share the words “short and plain” with Rule 
8(a)(2), Rule 8(c) does not contain such language.262  Even if Rule 8(b) 
describes a general pleading standard that also applied to affirmative 
defenses under Rule 8(c), that congruence does not implicate Twombly.  
The argument that it does ignores the condition in Rule 8(a)(2) that the 
“short and plain” statement of the claim must “show[] that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”263  This “showing” condition in Rule 8(a) is interpreted 
in Twombly (and Conley before it)264
 
 258. See id. at *7 (striking the affirmative defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel, 
consent/acquiescence, plaintiff’s fault, fault of others, and unclean hands). But see Baum v. 
Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 
9, 2010) (refusing to strike the equitable defense of unclean hands). 
 as necessitating that a claim display 
 259. See Voeks, 2008 WL 89434, at *7. 
 260. See supra note 35. 
 261. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra note 35. 
 263. See supra note 35. 
 264. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
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the “grounds” upon which it rests.265  The language of Rules 8(b) and 8(c) 
does not require that a defendant show anything relating to the asserted 
defenses, affirmative or otherwise.266  As such, there is no requirement in 
the Federal Rules that a defendant must display any grounds upon which its 
affirmative defenses rest.  Rule 8(c) only requires that a defendant 
“affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”267
The Charleswell court’s well-phrased argument to this effect has not 
been countered by any court extending the Twombly standard to affirmative 
defenses.
 
268  Many such courts have been at pains to do so, usually 
neglecting to mention Rule 8(c) in their analyses or glossing over the 
particularities of Twombly’s language.269  Moreover, the Federal Rules 
require that a defendant plead any affirmative defense that it has.270  The 
penalty for failure to so plead is the risk of losing any affirmative defenses 
not pled.271
Such stretched readings of the Federal Rules are, if nothing else, 
unnecessary.  The Rules already give recourse to plaintiffs to defend 
themselves against poorly supported affirmative defenses.
  It is procedurally unjust to penalize defendants for asserting 
affirmative defenses in the manner required by the Federal Rules, but this is 
what an extension of the Twombly standard entails. 
272  Even if the 
threat of sanctions under Rule 11 is not sufficient to defend against terse 
and ambiguous defenses, the Federal Rules also supply a more tailored 
remedy to the problem:  Rule 12(e) motions for a more definite 
statement.273
Moreover, the Federal Rules are statutory and have a defined amendment 
process.
  These rules are more appropriate remedies for insufficient 
pleading of affirmative defenses than an extension of the Twombly standard. 
274  Despite perceived expediencies of different rules, it is not 
within the authority of the district courts to change the scope or meaning of 
the Rules.  An application of the Rules that contravenes or obfuscates their 
plain meaning violates both the purpose of the Rules and the function of 
their most significant recent amendments.275  This application treads 
closely toward violating the Rules Enabling Act.276
 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 68–71. 
 
 266. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 35. 
 268. See supra text accompanying notes 230–32. 
 269. See supra notes 197–206 and accompanying text. 
 270. See FED R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state 
any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) (“Every defense to a 
claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is 
required.”). 
 271. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 94, 233–35 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 29–30, 91 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Extending the Twombly Standard to Affirmative Defenses Is 
Unprecedented (Even in Twombly) 
The Supreme Court conspicuously couched Twombly and Iqbal in the 
structure and language of Rule 8(a).277  In fact, there is no precedent 
requiring the district courts to extend the Twombly standard to affirmative 
defenses under Rule 8(c).278
Twombly itself did not fully overrule Conley, but rather only Conley’s 
“no set of facts” language.
  The precedents relied upon by those courts 
that extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses are weak at best, 
and even tend to allow for succinctly pleaded affirmative defenses to stand. 
279  The remainder of Conley remains good 
law.280  Conley emphasized the primacy of the Federal Rules and the other 
procedural tools available to the courts to “disclose more precisely the basis 
of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts 
and issues.”281  Similarly, the frequently cited Woodfield precedent plainly 
allows for the mere naming of an affirmative defense.282  A succinctly 
phrased affirmative defense should survive either of these standards.  
However, this has not prevented the careful parsing of precedent by courts 
to extend the Twombly standard.283
The action within the district courts presents a very real danger of 
snowballing, wherein a court notices a majority position on the issue and is 
influenced to rule on the same side.
 
284  Because the policy arguments 
espoused by courts extending the Twombly standard are indicative of 
exhaustion and a heavy workload, courts should reconsider the value of 
persuasive precedent that evinces a court’s own frustrations.285
 
 277. See supra notes 68–74, 118–27 and accompanying text. 
  The easy 
way out is not necessarily the right way, and the courts should not sacrifice 
the interests of justice on account of their own docket loads. 
 278. See supra notes 25, 249 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 281. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957); see also supra notes 47–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 165–67, 198 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra notes 207–16 and accompanying text.  Seven decisions referenced in this 
Note that extend the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses cite as persuasive the 
decision in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 
2558015 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008), which is written by an obviously frustrated judge. See 
Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 233 n.1 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Francisco v. 
Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09cv737, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *17 n.3 (E.D. Va. July 29, 
2010); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2010); 
Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 650 n.15 (D. Kan. 2009); Burget v. Capital 
W. Sec., Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 4807619, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009); 
Shinew v. Wszola, No. 08-14256, 2009 WL 1076279, at *4–5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 21, 2009); 
Fogel v. Linnemann (In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc.), No. 07 B 20870, No. 08 A 55, 
2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2495, at *16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009). 
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C.  Strike, Amend, Repeat 
It is unclear, however, that the courts’ dockets would be cleared by an 
extension of the Twombly standard.  While the standard may offer some 
efficiencies relating to discovery, it would also burden all parties and the 
court with dramatic increases in costly and time-consuming motion 
practice.286  While the expense of litigation may have been a motivating 
factor in establishing the Twombly standard for claims, perhaps counter-
intuitively, it weighs against extending that standard to affirmative 
defenses.287
First, Rule 12(f) motions to strike will arise more frequently because 
courts will be perceived as more receptive to them.
 
288  However, striking 
affirmative defenses is still a drastic remedy, even after Twombly.289  If 
motions to strike continue to be granted more liberally after the Twombly 
standard has been extended to affirmative defenses, then every policy 
consideration against motions to strike weighs equally against an 
extension.290  Moreover, when motions to strike are successful, the liberal 
policy of amendment for deficient affirmative defenses paves the way for 
even further cost and delay.291
In most cases, the colorable defenses of cost-conscious defendants will 
surface, and those that are not will either be discarded or will be summarily 
handled at trial.
 
292  Courts should remember in the first instance that the 
burden of proof remains with the defendant to support his affirmative 
defenses; there is no threat that justice will be hindered by the inclusion of 
more affirmative defenses.293
As a near-aside, the policy of liberally granting leave to amend is 
insufficient to protect defendants from the harshness of an extension of the 
 
 
 286. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text; see also Barnes v. AT&T Pension 
Benefit Plan-Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175–76 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“On 
a final note, the court reminds the parties that the court’s time is valuable and motions to 
strike are disfavored.  While it appears that the defendant made an attempt to resolve this 
dispute by proposing to stipulate to an amended answer, the court is disappointed that the 
parties were unable to come to an agreement.  It is the court’s opinion that while plaintiff 
partially succeeded on the merits of his motion, the issues raised would not have been 
difficult to address solely between the parties.  The parties should be reminded that the filing 
of a second motion to strike would be extraordinary and the parties might be well served by 
rereading Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 before making such a motion.”); Baum v. Faith 
Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *4 n.9 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 
2010) (“The utter lack of meaningful prejudice leaves the Court with the distinct impression 
that the parties need to step back and take a deep breath before filing motions.  The parties 
are encouraged to attempt to resolve their technical disputes between themselves, and are 
advised that sharp litigation practices are disfavored.  The parties are also advised that the 
mischaracterization of authority is not helpful.”); Miller, supra note 31, at 61–71. 
 287. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 189, 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
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Twombly standard.294  Those motions are frequently contested.295  Some 
facts in support of affirmative defenses may only come out during 
discovery, and the scope of discovery is limited to the pleadings.296  The 
defendant may not be allowed to discover the facts necessary to assert 
defenses it would otherwise have pled and runs the risk of waiving those 
defenses.297  Finally, motions to amend are sometimes denied and a 
defendant is left to suffer the consequences.298
D.  What Is Good for the Goose Is Not Always Good for the Gander 
 
Procedure, precedent, and policy have all discouraged the extension of 
the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.  Simple fairness does as well. 
First, it should be noted that the general criticisms of the Twombly 
standard as it applies to claims are equally applicable to its extension to 
affirmative defenses.299  While some commentators argue the necessity of 
extending the standard for fairness’ sake,300
A defendant is at a gratuitous disadvantage in the acquisition of factual 
material at the pleading stage.
 simply put, two wrongs will 
not make a right.  One cannot remedy any inequalities imposed upon 
federal pleading by Twombly by extending its standard even further. 
301  A blanket standard that does not account 
for this discrepancy shocks the conscience.  Shocking, too, is the 
inconsistency with which the district courts apply the standard, even where 
it has been extended.302  A defendant is left to guess whether a court will 
apply the standard at all and, if so, the standard’s parameters.  The federal 
pleading standard for defenses ought not to formalize such inequalities; 
where large sums of money and reputations may be on the line, defendants 
should be accorded every opportunity to defend themselves.  In all such 
considerations, the courts should remember the imperative of Rule 8(e):  
“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”303
CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court reinvented the federal pleading standard for claims in 
Twombly by abrogating Conley’s “no set of facts” language, which had 
determined the sufficiency of a pleaded claim for fifty years.  Because of 
Twombly’s scale, it is not surprising that there have been disagreements as 
to its scope.  Many district courts have found that Twombly extends beyond 
the bounds of what a simple reading of its text would suggest and have 
applied its reasoning and conclusion to the pleading of affirmative defenses.  
 
 294. See supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 7, 247–48, 250 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 155, 187–88, 220 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 20, 220 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 154, 157, 248 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 194. 
 301. See supra notes 240–43 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra note 35. 
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Such a tack is far from universal, however, as many other district courts 
have found that the standard for pleading claims articulated in Twombly is 
inapplicable to affirmative defenses.  The resolution of this conflict has the 
potential to impact every affirmative defense asserted in a federal court. 
Both sides of the issue rely heavily on the Federal Rules, preferred 
practice, and notions of fairness in coming to their conclusions.  However, 
as this Note has shown, procedure, precedent, and policy heavily support 
not extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses.  This 
conclusion assures that district courts will not disregard the text and 
intentions of the Federal Rules.  Moreover, this conclusion hews closer to 
Twombly itself.  It does this first by respecting the language of Twombly 
and the other precedents with which it interacts.  Second, it adheres more 
closely to the overt public policy consideration of Twombly by pursuing 
judicial efficiency and avoiding several rounds of unnecessary motion 
practice.  Abandoning the Federal Rules, precedent, and judicial efficiency 
by extending the Twombly standard to affirmative defenses would cause 
great injustice to the involuntary parties to federal actions, as defendants 
would be disallowed the benefits of a full and vigorous defense. 
